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1 
Intelligence-Led Policing: Comparing National Approaches to its 
Regulation and Control 
 
Introduction  
Intelligence-led policing (ILP) strategies are significant elements in modern policing 
arrangements.1 For some, policing’s enthusiasm for ILP is emblematic of 
‘surveillance society’ and its attendant iniquities.2 Others argue that even though 
some of the strategies commonly associated with the term may be unpalatable; the 
need for ILP simply is a pragmatic reality. It is a necessary evil justified by the 
increasing dangerousness of the social world.3 Policymakers’ enthusiasm for 
alternative models indicates an international transformation of public policing. Such 
significant change gives rise to a number of questions. Not least, in this new policing 
paradigm: do normative checks and balances provide sufficient protection for 
citizens’ rights; to what extent does this reconfiguration threaten the legitimacy of 
public policing; and, finally, should there be cross-jurisdictional harmonization of 
ILP-related law and regulation?  
 
Public policing 
A significant and enduring feature of the social contract is that support for the police 
institution always is conditional. Public policing has many aspects. Police prevent 
crime; deterring potential law-breakers, to keep communities safe. They enforce the 
                                                   
1 See J-P Brodeur, The Policing Web (Oxford University Press 2010); JH Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led 
policing (2nd edn, Routledge 2016); and A James, Understanding police intelligence work (Policy 
Press 2016). 
2 See D Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life (Open University Press 2001). 
3 See GT Marx, Undercover: police surveillance in America (University of California Press 1988); A 
James Examining intelligence-led policing (Palgrave Macmillan 2013); and H Carrapiço; D Irrera; 
and B Tuman Criminals and terrorists in partnership: unholy alliance (Routledge 2015). 
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law; intervening in conflict situations to apprehend those they identify as offenders. 
Police officers are bound by the rule of law. Their work commonly is authorized by 
common law, positive law or regulation, which inter alia enables monitoring of the 
conduct of the institution and its members.  
Ordinarily, policing takes place in public. In principle, rule infractions can 
easily be identified and remedies applied where appropriate.4 It is debateable 
whether the same can be said for ILP activities, which may be extraordinary and 
often are hidden from public view. It is not by accident that, in most liberal 
democracies, law significantly limits the ability of intelligence staff to conduct their 
activities. Broadly, it is understood that citizens are entitled to ‘protections and rules 
of process based on the basic compact between the people and the government’ no 
matter how transparent (or opaque) police action may be.5  
 
Intelligence Led Policing 
In the modern era, threats to nation states from professional criminals, criminal 
networks and terrorists have created environments in which politicians and 
policymakers more readily turn to information-based instruments of control. 
Substantially, ILP implies a shift from traditional reactive ‘fire-brigade’ style policing 
to a proactive approach founded on the systematic collection, evaluation, and 
analysis of information. Encouraged by their political overseers, police institutions 
have embraced the information collection opportunities that ILP affords, with 
                                                   
4 See for example M Punch, Police corruption and its prevention in European Journal on Criminal 
Policy and Research, [2000] 8(3), 301; CB Klockars; SK Ivkovic; and MR Haberfeld, The contours of 
police integrity (Sage 2004). 
5 FF Manget, Intelligence and Law Enforcement in LK Johnson (Ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
National Security Intelligence (Oxford University Press 2010, 189) 189-90. 
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enthusiasm.6 
Information management underpins modern ILP. Traditionally, the 
collection, filtering and sorting of information by public police forces was predicated 
on the need to meet the ordinary expectations of the criminal justice community and 
other stakeholders. Those activities were complementary but often incidental to the 
institution’s crime-fighting, peacekeeping and service delivery roles. Now, they are 
considered vital components in the formulation of policing and security plans.7  
A police department’s commitment to ILP implies that it prioritizes, and 
mainstreams its information management processes.8 It suggests that organizational 
energy is committed to using intelligence to direct policing plans.9. Largely, that 
translates into the targeting of groups and individuals suspected of committing (or 
planning to commit) criminal offences. In the post 9/11 world, those targeting 
processes have moved centre-stage as governments and state institutions 
increasingly place their trust in ILP as their best strategy for filling security gaps.10  
 
ILP methodologies 
Commonly used ILP methodologies include: interception of communications 
(capturing the content of a telephone call, letter or digital communication); collection 
                                                   
6 See JH Ratcliffe Ibid. 
7 See M den Boer, Intelligence Exchange and the Control of Organised Crime: From Europeanisation 
via Centralisation to Dehydration, in J. Apap and M. Anderson (Eds.) Police and Justice Co-operation 
and the New European Borders (Kluwer Law International 2002). 
8 See JH Ratcliffe Ibid. 
9 See C Harfield and K Harfield, Intelligence, Investigation, Community and Partnership, (Oxford 
University Press 2008); and A James Ibid. 
10 See N Tilley, Intelligence-led policing and disruption of organized crime: motifs, methods, and 
morals in T Delpeuch and JE Ross (Eds.) Comparing the Democratic Governance of Police 
Intelligence: New Models of Participation and Expertise in the United States and Europe, (Edward 
Elgar 2016). 
Submitted draft 
 
4 
of communications data (including their: duration; time; source and destination 
address, and so on); surveillance (the monitoring and/or recording of the 
movements of groups and individuals); and the use of informers or undercover 
police officers. 
More recently, ILP has developed to embrace new tools such as: biometric and 
drone technologies, the acquisition of data generated through the use of social 
media, and the investigation of encrypted electronic data. The use of such techniques 
often result in police officers infringing upon citizens’ land or property in 
circumstances that would ordinarily be labelled as criminal. For example, in many 
nations, the police routinely interfere with privately-owned motor vehicles to deploy 
tracking and monitoring devices.11  
 
Tactical convergence 
Today, there is ample evidence of convergence in practice; ILP techniques are used 
around the world. Though of course the legal, political, and social contexts in which 
they are employed vary considerably.12 Rather more consistently, it is at the nexus 
point where police and public meet, that human factors are of the greatest 
significance. It may be argued, justifiably, that the overwhelming majority of 
police/public interactions are unproblematic; the police act in lawful and 
procedurally fair ways. Equally, it is accepted that in the collective consciousness of 
                                                   
11 See for example Uzun v. Germany [2010] app. 35623/05. 
12 See GT Marx (Ibid.); M Innes and J Sheptycki, From detection to disruption: intelligence and the 
changing logic of police crime control in the United Kingdom in International Criminal Justice 
Review [2004] 14(1); and J Grieve, Developments in UK criminal intelligence in J Ratcliffe (Ed) 
Strategic Thinking in Criminal Intelligence (Federation Press 2004). 
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some communities, the idea that police officers will resort to rule-bending to get 
things done when the means are not justified, is well-established.13 Rule-bending and 
‘cover-ups’ are far from unknown.14 It follows, that if disproportionate, unnecessary 
or illegal police activity is to be identified, it is in the context of low visibility ILP that 
legislative certainty and vigorous oversight are needed the most. 
 
Controlling ILP  
Internal controls on police behaviour always have existed.15 They are consistent and 
enduring features of rational-legal bureaucracies but in the information age, some 
question their continuing appropriateness.16 Many nation states have replaced, or at 
least supplemented, internal ILP rules with statutory controls. The UK’s Police Act,17 
and Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA),18 the Netherlands’ introduction 
of its Special Investigative Police Powers Act,19 and Canada’s enactment of its Anti-
Terrorism Act,20 are examples of the legitimization of activities long undertaken but 
increasingly challenged, on constitutional or human rights grounds, by jurists and 
campaigners.21 In some cases, (as in the UK example) legislation is supplemented 
with oversight mechanisms that are designed to provide intrusive supervision both of 
                                                   
13 Apocryphally, the ‘Ways and Means Act’ is a fictional statute cited by police officers to justify their 
actions when legal means are unavailable. 
14 See for example PK Manning, Police Lying, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography [1974] 3(3); 
and; M Rowe; L Westmarland and C Hougham, Getting Behind the Blue Curtain in Accountability of 
Policing, Routledge Frontiers of Criminal Justice, (Taylor & Francis 2015). 
15 See for example DPJ Walsh, Intelligence and intelligence analysis (Routledge 2011). 
16 See N Tilley, Intelligence-led policing and disruption of organized crime: motifs, methods, and 
morals in T Delpeuch and JE Ross (Eds.) Comparing the Democratic Governance of Police 
Intelligence: New Models of Participation and Expertise in the United States and Europe (Edward 
Elgar 2016). 
17 UK, 1997, C.50. 
18 UK RIPA, 2000, C.23. 
19 Netherlands, 2014 A009 
20 SC, 2001, c.41. 
21 See S McKay, Covert Policing Law and Practice (2nd Edn, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
Submitted draft 
 
6 
judicially-authorized and extra-judicial ILP activity.22 
 
Higher level norms 
Higher-level norms (such as legitimacy, fairness and equality) always are germane to 
debates about the use of ILP methods and strategies. In democracies that claim the 
epithet ‘liberal’, these principles invariably are reflected in national legislation. 
Whether those rights are protected by constitution (as in the United States of 
America), by charter (in Canada), by treaty (such as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union – given full legal force by the Lisbon Treaty),23 or by 
convention (such as the European Union’s Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters),24 compliance with higher level norms is guaranteed only when the 
institution’s actions (or proposed actions) demonstrably are necessary, 
proportionate, and legal.  
Those who feel that the state’s agents have acted unconstitutionally or have 
violated basic human rights, may seek redress in nations’ supreme or constitutional 
courts. In Europe, the court of arbitration is the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), which has been a significant driver of legislative and procedural change. 
For example, its judgement in Govell vs. the UK [App. 27237/95, 14 January 1998] 
and Khan vs. the UK [2001, 31 EHRR 1016] led to the statutory regulation of audio 
surveillance in the UK. While judgements such as Kopp vs. Switzerland [App. 
13/1997/797/1000, 25 March 1998], and Natunen v Finland [App. 21022/04, 31 
                                                   
22 See C Harfield and K Harfield Ibid. 
23 EU 2007/C 306/01 
24 EU 2000/C 197/01 
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March 2009] provided clarity around nation states’ rights to intercept citizens’ 
communications. 
 ILP tactics invariably are controversial and their use routinely is contested.25 
Though those contests ultimately may play out in supra-national forums (like the 
ECtHR), the extent to which ILP is lawful, usually is decided in the first instance by 
national legislatures where legislation invariably reflects national interests, beliefs, 
social norms, cultures, attitudes and so on. Even if, universally, at a philosophical 
level there may be tacit agreement on the need for controls. Jones and others note 
that, substantially, research of policing and justice systems suggests that one cannot 
conceive of ‘simplistic pictures of cross-national convergence on the one hand or the 
stubborn persistence of national difference on the other’.26 In that context, the 
existence of bodies like the ECtHR, is essential if an international consensus is ever 
to be reached.  
 
Subsidiarity 
With its roots in Catholic theology, subsidiarity is a significant tenet of the 
constitutional discourse of legal systems around the world.27 In Europe, the principle 
was formally enshrined by the Maastricht Treaty, which established the European 
Community.28 Its aims were bold; adherence to the principle, is intended to 
guarantee a more efficient Europe, closer to citizens and respectful of localism and 
                                                   
25 See JE Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic Societies: A Comparative Study of the 
United States and Germany (2007). American Journal of Comparative Law, 55(3), 579. 
26 T Jones; R van Steden; and H Boutellier, Pluralization of policing in England & Wales and the 
Netherlands: exploring similarity and difference. Policing & Society [2009] 19(3), 283. 
27 See PG Carozza, Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international human rights law. American 
Journal of International Law [2003], v.101, 39. 
28 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191 of 29/7/1992. 
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national identity. Explained as the basis for limited government, subsidiarity warns 
against the overbearing action of nation states and other influential social actors. 
In the context of ILP, it cautions the police against turning to intrusive 
methods unless others have been tried and failed or when circumstances suggest 
that, were they attempted, they would not succeed. Even then, the police should use 
the least intrusive method available. In many countries, maintenance of citizens’ 
rights and freedoms may be understood as being reliant upon post hoc – usually 
judicial - oversight of practitioner’s decisions but they also depend upon relevant 
professionals’: knowledge; reflection; and skills.  
Because so many policing decisions are taken at the lowest level of the 
institution there is a direct and significant link between individual competence and 
constitutional freedoms.29 Sub-optimal levels of professional knowledge, expertise, 
and so on, are almost bound to deliver decisions that threaten citizens’ rights and 
liberties. They also present substantial reputational risks to state institutions like the 
public police.30 
 
Relevant cases 
This selection of cases, supports Jones and others argument about the unevenness of 
legislative controls but they also seem to confirm the international trend towards 
statutes that recognize the constitutional challenges presented by ILP.31 Any 
meaningful analysis in this context should begin with an examination of 
                                                   
29 J Kleinig, Handled with discretion: ethical issues in police decision making (Rowman & Littlefield 
1996).  
30 R Ericson, Ten uncertainties of risk-management approaches to security (2006). Canadian Journal 
of Criminology and Criminal Justice [2006] 48(3), 345. 
31 T Jones; R van Steden; and H Boutellier Ibid. 
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developments in the US. The September 2001 terrorist attacks sent a shockwave not 
only through the US but through the legislative systems of nation states around the 
world.32 The international convergence of formerly nation-specific approaches that 
followed, is an important strand in the ILP narrative. 
 
United States of America 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration’s declaration of a ‘War on Terror’ 
stimulated a substantial expansion of intelligence collection activity by nation states 
and their agents. The temporary powers granted to US social control agencies by the 
Patriot Act, 2001,33 enhanced wiretap authorities and extended the police’s ability to 
record citizens’ telephone communications and to carry out covert searches of 
premises.34 William Bloss argues that the Act signified ‘a change of course in the 
legislation designed to enhance police surveillance and search capability’.35  
US policing is regulated by constitutional, case, and statutory, laws. The 
exercise of surveillance, search, and seizure powers are governed by the Fourth 
Amendment to the US Constitution (which contains legal principles that guide police 
activity in those contexts) and by civil liberty principles, which establish safeguards 
against unreasonable police behaviour. The extent to which the new powers were 
compatible with those higher-level norms was challenged almost from the outset.  
Michael Dowley argues that a constitutionally acceptable balance between security 
                                                   
32 EJ Husabø, Counterterrorism and the Expansion of Proactive Police Powers in the Nordic States, 
Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention [2013] 14(1), 3. 
33 In 2006, the temporary provisions were entered permanently into federal statute via the USA 
PATRIOT Act, Additional Reauthorizing Amendments Act - S. 2271 (109th). 
34 WP Bloss, Transforming US police surveillance in a new privacy paradigm (2009). Police Practice 
and Research: An International Journal [2009] 10(3), 225. 
35 Bloss Ibid, 229. 
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and civil liberties is possible but the evidence suggests that the balance is tilted in 
favour of the state.36 For example, in 2014, it was revealed that agencies were making 
extensive use of the ‘sneak and peek’ powers granted under the Act.37 From 
September 2001 to April 2003, 47 searches were carried out nationwide. In 2010, 
3,970 requests were processed. Within three years that number increased to 11,129. 
It was found that relevant powers were used as an everyday investigative tool rather 
than in exceptional circumstances as legislators had intended.38 In fact, the powers 
were used in only a very small minority of cases involving terrorism.39 
 
Canada 
The rights of Canadian citizens are protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.40 Effective June 21, 1984, the Charter replaced the Canadian Bill of 
Rights and now forms an important part of the Canadian Constitution. Murphy 
argues that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, a ‘highly politicized "insecurity discourse" 
emerged’ … [this was] designed to educate and persuade Canadians to support a 
more aggressive national security [and, by extension, policing] agenda.41 As one of 
the US’s closest neighbours and firmest allies, it was only natural that the Canadian 
                                                   
36 M Dowley, Government Surveillance Powers under the USA Patriot Act: Is It Possible to Protect 
National Security and Privacy at the Same Time - A Constitutional Tug-of-War, Suffolk University 
Law Review, [2002] 36(1), 165. 
37 Section 213 of the Patriot Act granted law enforcement agencies the power to conduct a search while 
delaying notice to the suspect of the search. 
38 EFF, Peekaboo, I See You: Government Authority Intended for Terrorism is used for Other 
Purposes (2014). Available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/peekaboo-i-see-you-
government-uses-authority-meant-terrorism-other-uses 
39 R Balko, Surprise! Controversial Patriot Act power now overwhelmingly used in drug 
investigations. (29 October 2014). Washington Post online at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/29/surprise-controversial-patriot-
act-power-now-overwhelmingly-used-in-drug-investigations/ Accessed 14/9/2017. 
40 Canada Act 1982 [U.K.]. 
41 See C Murphy, Securitizing’ Canadian Policing: A New Policing Paradigm for the Post 9/11 Security 
State? (2004) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology [2004] April, 37(1), 155. 
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government would support it at a time of crisis.  
In 2001, Canada passed its Anti-Terrorism Act.42 David Schneiderman argued 
that the Act was a necessary response to living in an increasingly risk society even 
though it limited many of the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by citizens.43 The Act 
significantly expanded ILP powers in Canada.44 Essentially, it became easier for 
public police to obtain search warrants, detain suspects without charge, and extend 
their surveillance activities. Significantly, as grounds for police action, it substituted 
‘reasonable belief’ with the less rigorous test of ‘reasonable suspicion’.45 
Jennifer Stoddard, then Canada’s Privacy Commissioner was one of a number 
of commentators to highlight the threats to civil liberties inherent in this all-
encompassing piece of legislation.46 She warned that if the logic of anti-terrorism was 
allowed to permeate all aspects of policing and safety, ‘large scale systems of 
surveillance will increasingly erode privacy rights in Canada, without critical 
assessment where it is appropriate to draw the line’.47 
Arguably, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (RCMP) actions in conducting 
operations against 89 Canadian citizens – all members of the same racial group - 
associated with protests against the development of natural resources, are the kinds 
of human rights abuses Stoddard had in mind.48 The RCMP’s own report on those 
events, accepted the need for organizational change that ensured, ‘peaceful and law-
                                                   
42 Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015 (Bill C-51) S.C. 2015, c. 20. 
43 In E Zureik with K Hindle, Governance, Security and Technology: the case of biometrics, Studies in 
Political Economy 73 [2004] Spring/Summer 2004, 113. 
44 See V Steeves and V Piňero V, Privacy and Police Powers: Situating the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy Test, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice [2008] 50(3), 263. 
45 C Murphy Ibid. 
46 Cited in C Murphy Ibid, 464. 
47 C Murphy Ibid. 
48 J Barrera, RCMP intelligence centre compiled list of 89 indigenous rights activists considered 
‘threats’. National News, 8 November 2016 at http://aptn.ca/news/2016/11/08/rcmp-intelligence-
centre-compiled-list-of-89-indigenous-rights-activists-considered-threats/ Accessed 14/9/2017 
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abiding individuals engaged in acts of legitimate dissent’ would not be investigated 
or analysed’ in the future.49 
 
The Nordic States 
Erling Husabø argues that a significant feature of Nordic criminal justice systems 
after 9/11 was a ‘shift in focus from a retrospective to a prospective use of criminal 
law’.50 That was only natural. In any calculation of threat, risk or harm; the 
opportunity to prevent a criminal act (particularly a terrorist act) invariably will be 
prioritized over waiting for the act to take place and then dealing with its aftermath 
but any move towards a more proactive approach was bound to have a substantial 
impact on the broader criminal law. Such was the case in the Nordic states, which 
saw the same expansion in the use of ‘extraordinary’ police powers witnessed in the 
other cases examined here.51 
In Sweden, the initial policy impetus that followed 9/11, ‘petered out by 2003’, 
but – it is argued - was reinvigorated by the Madrid bombings which had a deeper 
impact in the EU as a whole than the 9/11 attacks.52 There was an element of ‘push-
back’ in some states. For example, covert audio surveillance of private rooms was 
accepted, and legislated for, in Denmark and Iceland but not in Sweden or Norway. 
                                                   
49 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Project SITKA: serious criminality associated to large public 
order events with national implications. RCMP 2015, 24) 
50 EJ Husabø Ibid. 
51 See for example EJ Husabø Ibid.   
52 V Strandh and N Eklund, Swedish Counterterrorism Policy: An Intersection Between Prevention 
and Mitigation? [2015] Studies in Conflict & Terrorism; 38(5), 359. 
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Though largely, as in the other cases examined here, states have chosen to move in a 
direction that has delivered more intrusion even if there is more regulation.53  
 
The United Kingdom 
Scholars agree that the roots of ILP can be found in the UK.54 The notion that 
intelligence analysis, the increasing specialization of the police workforce and the 
adoption of tools and techniques usually associated with the higher policing function 
– activity in the cause of protecting/maintaining the state - could revolutionize 
policing had taken hold long before 9/11.55 Since the 1980s, the UK’s traditional faith 
in the philosophy of policing by consent, underpinned by a common-law tradition of 
implicit police power, was eroded as policing gradually was subjected to formal, often 
statutory, controls.  
 Just as in the other cases examined here, the terrible events of 9/11 
accelerated the state’s investment in the formal ILP mechanisms that emerged in the 
1990s (following the publication of the Audit Commission’s report). Regulatory 
clarity around these activities was provided by the introduction of RIPA. The Act was 
welcomed for the transparency it brought to covert policing activities; introducing 
new systems of governance and oversight for traditionally secret practices such as: 
the recruitment of informers, the interception of communications, the recording of 
                                                   
53 See EJ Husabø and I Bruce, I, Fighting Terrorism through Multilevel Criminal Legislation: 
Security Council Resolution 1373. EU Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and their 
Implementation in Nordic, Dutch and German Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
54 See N Tilley Ibid; B Harbisher, Unthinking Extremism: Radicalizing Narratives that Legitimize 
Surveillance, Surveillance & Society [2015] 13(3/4), 474; and Ratcliffe 2016 Ibid. 
55 See J-P Brodeur, High and Low Policing: Remarks about the Policing of Political Activities Social 
Problems [1983] 30(5), 507 and UK Audit Commission, Helping with enquiries: tackling crime 
effectively (Audit Commission 1993) 
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communications data, and surveillance.56 The UK also witnessed the same extension 
(observed in the USA and Canada) of the use of ‘extraordinary’ policing methods into 
the mainstream. For example, in the period April 2015 to March 2016, UK law 
carried out at least 7,000 surveillance operations (with more than 1,000 
authorizations to conduct surveillance in force at year’s end.57 
In the UK too, environmental protest was considered an appropriate target for 
ILP. Regardless of the RIPA–inspired oversight arrangements, that fact largely 
remained hidden from public view until 2010 when the discovery of inappropriate 
relationships between undercover officers and activists led to the premature ending 
of a high-profile court case. The police’s evidence collection methods were deemed 
lawful but an internal review found that the level of intrusion into activists’ private 
lives was so excessive they were barely legitimate.58 Concerns over the efficacy of that 
action were confirmed when it was discovered that an undercover officer had 
fathered an activist’s child.59 Concrete proposals for reform of an oversight regime 
that permitted these kinds of deployments soon followed.60  
The result was a new Investigatory Powers Act.61 Portrayed by the UK’s Home 
Secretary as ‘world-leading legislation that provides unprecedented transparency 
and substantial privacy protection’, the new Act addresses some of the concerns 
                                                   
56 See A James Ibid. and JH Ratcliffe Ibid. 
57 See UKOSC, Annual Report of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner to the Prime Minister and to 
the Scottish Ministers (OSC, 2016). 
58 HMIC, Inspection of undercover policing in England and Wales (HMIC 2014). 
59 A fact recognized by the officer’s employers only in October, 2014 when the Metropolitan Police 
announced that it would make a payment of £425,000 to the child’s mother. See G Cooper, Bob 
Lambert, undercover cops, and the awful cost of sleeping with the enemy. Daily Telegraph (25 
October 2016) (online) at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11185926/Bob-
Lambert-undercover-cops-and-the-awful-cost-of-sleeping-with-the-enemy.html. Accessed 14/9/2017. 
60 See D Anderson, A Question of Trust – Report of the Investigatory Powers Review (Anderson 
2015) and RUSI, A Democratic Licence to Operate Report of the Independent Surveillance Review 
(RUSI 2015). 
61 UK Investigatory Powers Act 2016, C.25. 
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expressed by lobbyists and jurists but - despite its relatively smooth passage through 
Parliament and onto the statute book – to many, it is little more than a ‘snoopers’ 
charter’.62 Not least, because many its reforms seem to continue the international 
trend, in this context, of extending state power. One of the Act’s fiercest critics; Bella 
Sankey, the policy director of civil liberties group Liberty, said that, with its ‘eye-
wateringly intrusive powers and flimsy safeguards… [the Act served] as a beacon for 
despots everywhere’.63  
 
The Netherlands 
The Dutch National Intelligence Model was adopted in 2008.64 Officials believed ILP 
would add value to public order management, law enforcement, and policing’s ability 
to respond to emergencies.65 This led to increasing use of new technologies for crime 
prevention and surveillance, which became ‘commonly accepted aspects of everyday 
situations in Dutch urban settings’.66  Marielle den Hengst-Bruggeling and others 
note that security concerns, driven by the 9/11 attacks and the later bombings in 
London and Madrid heightened security fears at the same time as the police were 
being forced to reassess their ability to continue to meet the expectations of 
communities in an age of public sector austerity; creating a kind of ‘perfect storm’.67 
                                                   
62 Amber Rudd in A Griffin, Investigatory Powers Bill Passes into Law. The Independent (online) (29 
November 2016) at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/investigatory-
powers-bill-snoopers-charter-passed-royal-assent-spying-surveillance-a7445276.html Accessed 
14/9/2017 
63 In A Griffin Ibid. 
64 See M den Hengst and E Staffeleu, Different Information Organizations to Produce the Same High 
Quality Intelligence: An Overview of the Police Forces in the Netherlands, 2012. Policing, 6(2), 187. 
65 See M den Hengst-Bruggeling; B De Graaf; and P Van Scheepstal, Modelling intelligence-led 
policing to identify its potential European Journal of Policing Studies [2014] 1(3), 171. 
66 J Terpstra and K van der Vijver The Police, Changing Security Arrangements and Late Modernity: 
The Case of the Netherlands (2006). German Police Studies, [2006] 5(1), Spring, 80. 
67 M den Hengst-Bruggeling and others, Ibid. 
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 Until 2000, the Dutch criminal code did not specifically cover the kinds of 
techniques usually associated with ILP.68 This changed after a parliamentary 
investigation into the operations of the Netherlands’ interregional, organized crime 
investigation teams, which was highly critical of the oversight and control of their 
operations. The response to the committee’s recommendations was the Special 
Investigative Police Powers Act, 2000, which regulates investigative powers 
(including covert powers), providing both enhanced oversight and transparency.69 
 Researchers such as Dermot Walsh and Vicky Conway, and Kruisbergen and 
others, have challenged ILP’s opaqueness, arguing that the police need to make a 
stronger case for its use.70 The latter argue that information should be made 
available so that basic monitoring of those activities can be carried out. So that, for 
example, even though ILP operations may not in practice be ‘controllable’, they can - 
and should - be made more ‘verifiable and accountable’.71 
 
Contextualising ILP 
Arguably, in liberal democracies; legislators and policymakers, on the one hand, and 
those committed to the protection of constitutional rights, on the other are 
participants in a Manichean struggle over the proper limits of state control and the 
exercise of police powers. In part, that conflict is mediated by national legislators, by 
                                                   
68 EW Kruisbergen; D de Jong; and ER Kleemans, Undercover Policing: Assumptions and Empirical 
Evidence British Journal of Criminology [2011] 51(2), 394. 
69 Netherlands, Wet bijzondere opsporingsbevoegdheden, (Wet BOB) 1 February, 2000. 
70 See DPJ Walsh and V Conway, V, Police Governance and Accountability: Overview of Current 
Issues Crime, Law and Social Change [2011] 55(2–3), 241; and EW Kruisbergen; ER Kleemans; and 
D de Jong, Controlling Criminal Investigations: The Case of Undercover Operations Policing, Volume 
[2012] 6(4), 398. 
71 EW Kruisbergen and others 2012, Ibid.  
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police departments, and by officers themselves but the theme that dominates that 
narrative is the extension rather than the limiting of police powers;72 justified as a 
response to threats to those societies posed by wicked problems such as terrorism 
and the like.73 
The cases examined here suggest a reconfiguring of public policing as 
commonly accepted goals are replaced with those of disruption and dislocation.74 
Disruption has been core business for security services and armed forces for many 
years; usually as a component of wider counter-insurgency strategies.75 It also has 
been a common feature of totalitarian policing regimes.76 Increasingly, it seems to be 
an accepted method of policing in democratic societies.77  
 
The ILP brand 
With an ever-expanding fan base and name recognition worldwide, the ILP brand 
resonates strongly with those who see the primary purpose of policing as crime 
control. The optimism, positivity and dynamism that routinely have come to be 
associated with the brand, distinguish it from other policing strategies. It has created 
a lasting and positive impression in the minds of policymakers and practitioners.78 
For many, ILP represents a smarter form of policing that energizes staff and 
                                                   
72 G Mythen and S Walklate, Criminology and terrorism which thesis? Risk society or 
governmentality? British Journal of Criminology [2006] 46(3), 379. 
73 Wicked problems - ‘that class of problems which are ill-formulated, where the information is 
confusing, where there are many decision makers and clients with conflicting values, and where the 
ramifications in the whole system are confusing’ (N Wittel cited in Churchman, 1967 p.B141) 
74 See C Harfield and K Harfield Ibid; JH Ratcliffe Ibid; and N Tilley Ibid. 
75 N Tilley Ibid. 
76 J Gieseke, The Stasi and East German Society: Some Remarks on Current Research Bulletin of the 
German Historical Institute, Supplement [2014] 9, 59. 
77 J-P Brodeur cited in N Tilley Ibid. 
78 J Ratcliffe Ibid. 
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demonstrates to stakeholders and communities, the institution’s ability to fuse 
technological, organizational, and human skills to transform practice.  
 Publicly, ILP has few critics. Arguably, for the institution, it is the perfect 
policing strategy because it prioritizes action, which for many ‘street cops’, and even 
for some ‘management cops’, is their professional raison d’etre.79 A brand can confer 
a value on a product that exceeds its functional purpose. The ILP brand is 
distinguished from other policing strategies by its explicit link with intelligence and 
its more nuanced but perhaps obvious links with the technological advances that are 
characteristic of the information age. Its endorsement by high profile, influential, 
international bodies such as Interpol, Europol, the US Department of Justice, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), have only added further lustre to ILP’s 
reputation as the epitome of smart, innovative, intelligent, policing.  
 Christopher Murphy argues that its rhetoric of success resonates powerfully 
with communities and ‘validates the trend to broader domestic intelligence-
gathering and analysis’.80 Its many adherents across the world certainly seem 
disposed to invest heavily in the emerging technologies of the information age and to 
channel scarce resources to it.81 That is not to say that support for ILP is universal; 
for many police insiders, ILP is both undesirable and unwelcome because it detracts 
                                                   
79 E Reuss-Ianni, Two cultures of policing: street cops and management cops. (Transaction 
Publishers 1993). 
80 C Murphy, C, Securitizing’ Canadian Policing: A New Policing Paradigm for the Post 9/11 Security 
State? Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology [2004] April 37(1), 155. 
81 See B Flood, Strategic aspects of the UK National Intelligence Model in J Ratcliffe (Ed), Strategic 
Thinking in Criminal Intelligence (Federation Press 2003, 37); New Jersey State Police, Practical 
Guide to Intelligence-led Policing (2006) at 
https://www.ncirc.gov/documents/public/NJSP_Guide_to_Intelligence_Led_Policing.pdf;  
S Mallory, The Concept of Asymmetrical Policing. IPES Working Paper o/12, September 2007; 
Ratcliffe 2016 Ibid.; and San Antonio Police Department, Intelligence Led Policing (2016) at 
http://www.sanantonio.gov/SAPD/IntelligenceLedPolicing.aspx  
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from the community-focused initiatives that traditionally have dominated in public 
policing.82 
 
Legislative clarity 
Nick Tilley’s representation of a typology of disruption as a ‘specific form of ILP’, 
ranges from reducing opportunities for offending (for example, by closing down 
businesses dealing in illicit goods) to sowing the seeds of distrust amongst offenders 
(for example, by feeding out disinformation through informers. He highlights that 
though these methods have huge appeal for the police, their use is rarely tested in 
criminal courts, and that raises important questions of public accountability, of trust 
in the police institution, and around the notion of personal liberty.83 Peter Gill and 
Christopher Murphy have issued similar warnings about the dangers represented by 
these kinds of shifts in the normative aims of public policing in late modernity.84  
More than 20 years ago Peter Waddington argued that the reactive / 
responsive approach was more legitimate than available alternatives because the 
standard trigger for police action is public concern.85 More recently, Mike Maguire 
has argued that reactive policing delivers both societal and financial benefits; the 
police involve themselves in the lives of citizens only when the latter decide that a 
social situation has become so intolerable that it demands an intervention: whereas 
ILP approaches often are open-ended and prioritize ‘agendas set by the police’.86 
                                                   
82 A James, 2013 & 2016 Ibid. 
83 See N. Tilley Ibid. 
84 See P. Gill, Rounding up the Usual Suspects (Ashgate 2000); and C. Murphy Ibid. 
85 PAJ Waddington Calling the Police: The Interpretation of, and Response to, Calls for Assistance 
from the Public, (Avebury, 1993). 
86 M Maguire, Criminal Investigation and Crime Control in T. Newburn (Ed) Handbook of Policing, 
(2nd Edn, Willan 2008). 
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Practitioners may feel that these analyses over-simplify a complex set of 
interdependencies; efforts to resolve one aspect of an intractable problem often 
reveal other questions and problems but they should highlight that assessments of 
the social world often require a deeper understanding of its dynamics than an 
organisationally-consistent faith in tradition and orthodoxy can deliver.87 They also 
suggest to practitioners the need for greater objectivity in assessing the 
appropriateness and necessity for extraordinary policing methods; and the 
importance of robust and effective oversight of what essentially is extra-judicial 
police activity.  
 
Mission creep 
In some cases, increases in capacity have been accompanied by significant structural 
reforms. In the US, fusion centres - multi-agency intelligence sharing hubs, first seen 
in the military context - have flourished in the post-9/11 policing environment. Torin 
Monahan argues this has supported the ‘mission creep’ of America’s law enforcement 
agencies, which have: 
steadily ventured into … domains which have very little, 
or nothing at all to do with the War on Terror … Instead 
they have been used for a variety of other purposes, such 
as basic policing, spying on social movement 
organizations, or restricting legal public activities.88  
 
Robert Taylor and Amanda Russell argue that any reconfiguration of policing on 
                                                   
87 See A James, 2016 Ibid. and KC Wong, Policing in Hong Kong: history and reform (CRC Press 
2016) for examinations of police culture in this context.  
88 Cited in B Harbisher, Unthinking Extremism: Radicalizing Narratives that Legitimize Surveillance, 
Surveillance & Society [2015] 13(3/4), 474. 
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militaristic lines, undermines its very essence because it ‘confuses … foreign threats 
… [with] internal law enforcement and policing … [which] has the potential to trigger 
civil liberty abuses through invasions of privacy and racial profiling’.89 The ILP-
driven interventions against environmental protestors in the US, Canada, and the UK 
described here, perhaps can be seen in that vein. These cases raise important issues 
of institutional legitimacy and of legal and procedural fairness. For many readers, 
they will also stimulate concerns about the professional competence and ethical 
predisposition of staff, and about the structural constraints within which those staff 
operate.  
 Beyond national intelligence-sharing arrangements, it is possible to discern an 
increasing internationalization of cooperation between police intelligence agencies. 
Monica den Boer argued that in the European setting; EU institutions’ oversight and 
control mechanisms are not keeping pace with inter and intra agency intelligence 
sharing, which is expanding exponentially. She argued that ‘considerable governance 
challenges lurk around the corner’.90 John Occhipinti shares den Boer’s concerns, 
arguing that the mission creep of EU institutions like Europol and FRONTEX, should 
be a matter of much greater concern to jurists.91  
 
Professional competence  
At the micro level, ILP requires professionalism and expertise. Not least a deep 
understanding of human behaviour; the complexities of social situations; individuals’ 
                                                   
89 RW Taylor and AL Russell, The failure of police ‘fusion’ centers and the concept of a national 
intelligence sharing plan Police Practice and Research [2012] 13(2), 184. 
90 M den Boer, Counter-Terrorism, Security and Intelligence in the EU: Governance Challenges for 
Collection, Exchange and Analysis Intelligence and National Security [2015] 30(2-3), 402. 
91 J Occhipinti, Still Moving toward a European FBI? Re-examining the Politics of EU Police 
Cooperation Intelligence and National Security [2015] 30(2-3), 234; and APJCLE (2013). 
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strengths and weaknesses - their motivations and goals; and, ultimately, their 
trustworthiness. As the author discovered in his research into police intelligence 
practice,92 the requisite levels of professional knowledge and reflection often are in 
short supply in an institution conditioned over many decades to act and to react 
rather than to pause, to reflect; to seek both a deeper understanding of the social 
world and their and the institution’s parts in it.  
The cases examined here illustrate some of the ways that states and their 
agencies blur the lines between different forms of deviance; constantly redefining 
‘dangerousness’. They also call into question intelligence staffs’ ability to reflect in 
sufficiently meaningful ways on principles such as the: proportionality; legality; 
subsidiarity; and necessity of the activities they plan or propose. That may be only 
natural. Kira Rønn has argued, those concepts inherently are ‘vague, ambiguous, and 
prone to subjectivity’.93  
In rational-legal bureaucratic structures like the police, the emphasis always is 
on the task in hand.94 One does not have to search very hard to find an example of 
the way in which closed environments can encourage a certain narrowness in 
thought and approach Commonly considered to represent one of the greatest failures 
of intelligence in the modern era, the UK’s involvement in the Iraq War 
                                                   
92 A James 2016 Ibid; and A James, The path to enlightenment: limiting costs and maximizing returns 
from intelligence-led policy and practice in public policing, Policing [2017] doi: 
10.1093/police/paw050. 
93 KV Rønn, Democratizing Strategic Intelligence? On the feasibility of an objective, decision-making 
framework when assessing threats and harms of organized crime Policing [2012] 7(1), 53. 
94 See N Cope, Crime analysis: principles and practice in T. Newburn (Ed) Handbook of Policing 
(Willan 2003, 340); and A James 2016 Ibid. 
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demonstrated only too clearly the symbiotic links between, effectiveness, 
transparency, and accountability in intelligence practice.95 
Often, it seems that shortcomings are recognised only when things go so badly 
wrong that the veil of secrecy that surrounds the work is penetrated.96 Peter Manning 
highlights that only rarely are intelligence staffs held to account for their work 
because their efforts, generally, are not ‘concerned with producing trustworthy 
evidence for … attorneys, judges, and juries’. Instead, their data and their 
observations ‘stay in the room’ and are used inter alia to direct resources, to inform 
crime reduction strategies and to ‘feed discussions that socialize [arguably, 
condition] intelligence insiders’.97 Nancy Lewis argues that the most significant 
inhibitor of information-sharing is culture, which has reinforced the traditional 
insularity of policing.98 Arguably, these are conditions in which ‘ways and means’ 
might sometimes be afforded greater significance than regulation and due process. 
There is some evidence that policymakers are beginning to recognise the need 
for meaningful change. Chris Hayes the chair of the Australian Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Law Enforcement (APJCLE) has highlighted law enforcement and 
intelligence practitioners’ frustrations with the ‘limitations, challenges and hurdles’ 
to intelligence practice commonly encountered by the Australian national security 
                                                   
95 See S Tully, The Chilcot Report on Iraq and lessons for Australia (2016). LSJ: Law Society of NSW 
Journal, (26), 78; Lord Butler, Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction Report of a 
Committee of Privy Counsellors (HMSO 2004); and J Chilcot, Report of the Iraq Inquiry (HMSO 
2016). 
96 See for example: M Bichard, The Bichard Inquiry Report (HMSO 2004); and APJCLE, Australian 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Inquiry into the gathering and use of criminal 
intelligence (Secretariat of the Australian Federal Government 2013).    
97 PK Manning, Democratic policing: case working and intelligence. Comparing the Democratic 
Governance of Police Intelligence: New Models of Participation and Expertise in the United States 
and Europe (Edward Elgar 2016, 180). 
98 N Lewis, Expanding surveillance: connecting biometric information systems to international police 
cooperation in E Zureik and M Salter (Eds.) Global Surveillance and Policing (Willan 2013, 97). 
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and law enforcement agencies.99 He said that the committee had brought to light: 
Serious … impediments to the flow of intelligence which 
produce … an incomplete picture of criminal threats and 
undermine stakeholder confidence. Some law 
enforcement agencies hold reservations about sharing 
their own information and seem not to recognize the 
value added to that information when converted into 
intelligence and returned to them… [Lack] of a common 
approach to collecting, collating, analysing and 
disseminating criminal intelligence underpinning a 
common ethos.100  
 
Contemporaneously, police leaders in the UK accepted the existence of the 
same kinds of shortcomings in their own intelligence systems; recommending inter 
alia that the institution needed to commit to ‘consensus building; developing 
relationships with individuals and institutions outside the policing bubble’.101 Taken 
together, these statements suggest that insiders seem to accept the need for 
change.102  
 
The silver bullet 
Any discussion of ‘extraordinary’ policing methods must acknowledge the 
susceptibility of the police to the lure of ‘silver-bullet’ type solutions to seemingly 
intractable, problems. The UK’s National Intelligence Model, which routinely is 
lauded as the template for ILP success, delivered far less than the rhetoric 
                                                   
99 APJCLE Ibid. 
100 Cited in APJCLE Ibid. 
101 Cited in A James 2016 Ibid. 
102 See also OSCE, Intelligence-led policing (2016). Available at 
http://polis.osce.org/library/f/5113/4618/OSCE-EU-EVT-5113-EN-4618.pdf Accessed 14/9/2017; 
and BA Jackson, Strengthening Trust between Police and the Public in an Era of Increasing 
Transparency (RAND Corporation, 2015). 
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suggests.103 Interestingly, the model largely avoided external review and, though it 
remains a factor in British policing (albeit in a much-amended form), it has faded 
into the background without changing UK policing very much; even if the rhetoric 
suggests otherwise. Arguably, the philosophies underpinning the model have had 
much greater impact elsewhere in the world.104   
 A persuasive case can be made for strategies that emerge from rigorous and 
transparent processes of intelligence collection, validation, and selection, so that 
policing’s scarce resources are used, intelligently. However, scholarly literature about 
the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of ILP seems to be rather limited. In 
particular, there is a relative paucity of published empirical research into ILP. 
Beyond the rather obvious challenge of solving any complex problem in hierarchical, 
rational-legal bureaucracies, ILP may not be the answer to policing’s ills in this 
context because it demands levels of professional knowledge, expertise, and 
reflection that currently are in short supply in the public police.105  
 That is less a commentary on the ability of individual practitioners as it is on 
the willingness or the ability of the police executive to help intelligence practitioners 
to overcome the structural barriers that limit their influence over the wider 
organization and wider socio-political issues such as the direction and control of the 
public police. 
 
                                                   
103 See P Amey; C Hale, and S Uglow, Development and Evaluation of a Crime  
Management Model (Home Office Police Research Group 1996); and A James 2013 & 2016 Ibid.  
104 The rejection of a prophet in their own land is a long-established, well-known and well-understood 
phenomenon. See for example H Brady, Europol and the European Criminal Intelligence Model: a 
non-state response to organized crime Policing [2008] 2(1), 103. 
105 See IP Stanier, Contemporary organizational pathologies in police information sharing: new 
contributions to Sheptycki's lexicon of intelligence in policing (Doctoral dissertation, London 
Metropolitan University 2013); and A James 2013 & 2016 Ibid. 
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Conclusions 
Post 9/11, nations increasingly have trusted ILP for the defence of the state and the 
protection of citizens. ILP has been embraced across the world as the most effective 
way of combating terrorism and controlling transnational organised crime. The 
police institution’s faith in the merits of ILP, not least its action-orientation, is 
culturally and organizationally consistent but its apparent success seems, at least in 
part, a triumph of marketing and branding. In assessing the utility of ILP, some 
agencies seem to under-appreciate its threat to long-established legal and ethical 
norms. Some trends in those developments can be discerned.  
There has been: a shift towards the professionalisation of police intelligence 
practice; a formalisation of multi-agency law enforcement intelligence-cooperation 
(for example, in the form of fusion centres); the internationalisation of intelligence-
cooperation between police agencies and other partners; and a significant expansion 
in the use of what formerly were considered ‘extraordinary’ policing methods. Some 
may consider that, in totality, this is no more than is necessary to address the 
increasing dangerousness of the social world but these developments have significant 
implications for legislators, for policymakers, and for international law.  
The professionalization of intelligence practice, the cornerstone of ILP, 
increasingly relies on the development and refinement of data collection, data 
mining, and intelligence analysis techniques and that has significant implications for 
privacy and for citizens’ rights. Applying these techniques tests the capacities and 
capabilities of staffs who employ them. As the cases explored here show, the 
application of important principles like proportionality, subsidiarity, and necessity 
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always are based upon subjective judgements. Problems may emerge even when 
legislative and constitutional clarity exists.  
ILP requires a particular set of skills: a deep knowledge of law and regulation 
and an innate respect for human rights. It also requires appreciation of the 
capabilities and limitations of investigative technologies. In the information age, 
police departments and intelligence practitioners need to reflect upon the real utility 
of concepts such as ‘need to know’ and ‘neither admit nor deny’, which for so long 
have been central to decision-making and which always have mitigated efforts to 
make that practice more transparent.106 Above all, task-focused practitioners must 
recognise their wider responsibilities to principles such as fairness and transparency 
and prioritise due process. Effective and intrusive extra-institutional oversight is 
needed so that rule infractions are identified and sanctions applied when necessary. 
Without that kind of oversight and scrutiny, public confidence in the policing 
institution is bound to diminish. 
An analysis of state controls was beyond the scope of this analysis but some 
common developments in the cases examined are obvious. In the modern era, 
governments have responded to the threat of organized crime and terrorism by 
enacting more, and more far-reaching, controls. Normatively, officials argue that 
change is necessary to buttress the state and to keep citizens safe but calculations of 
security needs, invariably raise questions such as ‘How much security do citizens 
                                                   
106 When used by governments and their agencies in the context of intelligence practice, ‘need to 
know’ refers to the restriction of classified data to those who have a specific, officially-authorised, 
need for it. First used by the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency in the Cold War Era, ‘neither 
confirm nor deny’ has become the standard response from governments around the world, to deflect 
questions about their clandestine activities.  
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require?’ and ‘Do extant or future threats warrant the surrender of traditional 
liberties and freedoms’? Answers to those questions always are politically, socially 
and culturally contingent but the cases studied here suggest a propensity to privilege 
the interests of the state over the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens.  
These cases show that what once were considered extraordinary methods, 
increasingly are being used in the public policing milieu for ordinary policing 
purposes. Their use threatens long-cherished rights and freedoms; particularly when 
the methods are employed inappropriately or disproportionately. Higher-level norms 
(expressed in constitutions, charters, conventions, or the like) are meant to safeguard 
citizens’ rights. Against that background, some may feel that cross-jurisdictional, 
supra-national, harmonization of ILP-related law and regulation, consistent with 
those norms, will provide citizens with the protections they need. Though an 
international consensus on that point, largely has eluded the efforts of policymakers.  
In our imperfect world, perhaps a more realistic goal is a series of nation-
specific arrangements that deliver workable compromises that more obviously 
privilege citizens’ constitutional rights to security and liberty. The challenge of 
achieving even such a limited goal should not be underestimated but such a move 
might perhaps add measures of verifiability and accountability to processes that, at 
least for the short term, appear to be able to resist efforts to control them.   
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